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Abstract
We utili:e Schmookler?s @19BBC concept of demand-induced invention to study the role
of income ineJuality in an endogenous gro-th model. Ms rich consumers can satisfy more
-ants than poor consumers5 2oth prices and market si:es for ne- products5 as -ell as their
evolution over time5 are determined 2y the income distri2ution. We sho- ho- a change in
the distri2ution of income a!ects the incentive to innovate and hence long-run gro-th. In
general5 less ineJuality tends to discourage the incentive to innovate5 2ut this depends on
the nature of the redistri2ution.
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eRoes man simply invent -hat he can5 so that the inventions he makes in any
period are essentially those -hich 2ecame possi2le in the previous periodf Or is
it to man?s -ants -ith their di!erent and changing intensities5 and to economic
phenomena associated -ith their satisfaction5 that one must primarily look for
the ebplanationf In short5 are inventions mainly knowledge-induced or demand-
induced?”
Jaco2 Schmookler @19BBC5 Invention and Economic Yro-th5 p.12.
1 Introduction
In his seminal 2ook eInvention and Economic Yro-th5e Schmookler @19BBC emphasi:es the
importance of edemand-induced inventionse g the fact that an invention reJuires not only
pre-ebisting kno-ledge 2ut also a su!ciently urgent want that consumers seek to satisfy.
Remand-induced inventions have not received much attention in recent theories of innova-
tion and gro-th.1 In these theories5 it is typically assumed that each potential innovation is
eJually useful and the demand-side plays a passive role.
In this paper5 -e present an endogenous gro-th model -hich puts emphasis on the demand-
side. Wy ela2orating Schmookler?s concept of edemand-induced inventionse -e study ho- the
distri2ution of income a!ects the process of innovation and long-run gro-th. Our starting
point is that @iC the various -ants are not equally urgent and that @iiC it depends on the
level of a consumer’s income -hich -ant he or she is a2le to satisfy. In terms of Schmookler?s
introductory Juestion5 the intensity of a particular -ant changes over time as economic gro-th
increases the consumers? -illingness to pay for this -ant?s satisfactionh and this intensity -ill
di"er across consumers as the rich have a higher -illingness to pay than the poor.
To capture the idea that some -ants are more urgent than others5 -e introduce the concept
of hierarchic preferences -hich ranks the various -ants 2y their priority. In this hierarchy5 the
most 2asic needs are ranked rst and the more luburious -ants are ranked 2ehind. Ms the
num2er of currently satisa2le -ants is limited 2y the num2er of ebisting goods5 it reJuires
innovations to satisfy additional -ants. In other -ords5 the scope for innovations consists of
the list of those currently unsatisa2le -ants -hich can conceiva2ly 2e met 2y technical means.
1 In line -ith Schmookler @and unlike SchumpeterC5 -e use the terms einventione and einnovatione synony-
mously.
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The direction of actual innovation is determined 2y the relative urgency of these -ants.
In such a frame-ork of analysis5 the distri2ution of income plays a crucial role for the
evolution and prota2ility of ne- markets5 and thus for long-run gro-th. To see ho- the
mechanism -orks5 consider the dynamics of demand and prots for a rm after a successful
innovation. This market is initially small as only rich consumers purchase a ne- product. With
gro-ing incomes5 the ebtent of the market ebpands and rms earn higher prots. The gro-th
in prots is either due to the intensive margin @old consumers are -illing to pay a higher priceC
or to the extensive margin @additional consumers are -illing to purchase at the same priceC.
dence the income distri2ution a!ects the value of an innovation in a compleb -ay 2y shaping
an innovator?s demand curve and shifting it in the gro-th process.
While our analysis holds for a general distri2ution of income5 the intuition is most easy
to grasp in the contebt of a t-o-class society. With t-o classes5 the distri2ution of income is
determined 2y t-o parameters_ relative incomes and relative population si:es of rich and poor.
do- does ineJuality a!ect the incentive to innovatef Mssume there is less income ineJuality
due to a lower relative income of rich to poor. This has t-o opposing e!ects on innovation
incentives. On the one hand5 such a redistri2ution reduces the riches? -illingness to pay and
the innovator?s prots g as long as the ne- product is sold ebclusively to the rich. On the other
hand5 such a redistri2ution makes the poor 2etter o! and allo-s them to a!ord more goods.
This has a favora2le e!ect on innovators? prots as the market for a ne- product -ill develop
more Juickly into a mass market. We sho- that5 on net5 the former e!ect al-ays dominates
the latter. This is 2ecause prots 2ecome more ”backloaded”: The prot o- is lo-er early in
the life cycle and higher later on. Rue to discounting5 the early fall in prots out-eighs the
later increase and the value of an innovation decreases. In sum5 2ecause of more 2ackloaded
prots5 lo-er relative incomes have a negative e!ect on the incentive to innovate -hich reduces
gro-th.
When a more even distri2ution comes from a larger population size of the rich5 and each
rich class mem2er has a lo-er income @i.e. incomes are eless concentratede in the hands of a
fe- richC. Such a change in the distri2ution a!ects the incentive to innovate through a ”market
size e"ect” and a ”price e"ect”. The market si:e e!ect has a positive impact on the prot
o-5 2ecause there are more individuals purchasing the ne- good right from the start-up of
the 2usiness. The price e!ect goes in the opposite direction. Ms the -illingness to pay for
Q
a ne- product decreases -ith a less -ealthy rich class5 innovators are forced to charge lo-er
prices. The relative si:e of these t-o e!ects clearly depends on the scope of price setting 2y
innovators. When no appropriate su2stitutes for the innovative products ebist5 the price e!ect
dominates the market si:e e!ect. do-ever5 if there are such su2stitutes the scope for price
setting 2y innovators is more limited and the market si:e e!ect 2ecomes dominant. Uore
eJuality discourages innovative activities in the former case5 2ut fosters it in the latter.
The paper is organi:ed as follo-s. Section 2 provides a 2rief revie- of related literature. In
Section Q -e specify our crucial assumptions on consumers? preferences and discuss consumers?
optimal choices in that contebt. Section 4 presents our assumptions on the income distri2ution
and Section 5 discusses technology and the rms? price setting 2ehavior. Section B analy:es
a uniJue 2alanced gro-th eJuili2rium and analy:es the relationship 2et-een ineJuality and
gro-th. Section a discusses other eJuili2ria. Section ] allo-s for a non-innovative sector
and discusses the implications for the ineJuality-gro-th relation. In Section 9 -e look at the
ro2ustness of our results -ith respect to the 2asic assumptions. Section 10 concludes.
2 Related literature
Mt a general level5 our paper is related to models that emphasi:e the importance of market si:e
and prot incentives for innovative activities -hich is central in RiR 2ased gro-th models
@Mghion and do-itt5 19925 Yrossman and delpman5 19915 Romer5 19905 Segerstrom et al5
1990C. do-ever5 in these models unsatised -ants are all alike5 so the issue of income ineJuality
and demand-induced innovations does not arise in any interesting -ay. In other -ords5 these
models typically assume homothetic preferences implying that income distri2ution does not
play any role for the market demand functions of innovating rms. In our model5 preferences
are non-homothetic so changes in the distri2ution of income a!ect patterns of demand and5 in
particular5 the dynamics of demand for ne- goods.
Our paper is also related to the recent literature on ineJuality and gro-th. do-ever5 the
mechanism that gives rise to such a relationship is Juite di!erent from the ones that have
2een discussed. The literature has either focused on the role of capital market imperfections
@see Yalor and Zeira @199QC5 WanerTee and Ne-man @199QC5 Mghion and Wolton @199aC5 Yalor
and Tsiddon @199aC5 Yalor and Uoav @200QC5 and many othersC or on political mechanisms
@Wertola @199QC5 Persson and Ta2ellini @1994C5 Mlesina and Rodrik @1994C5 and othersC or
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on a com2ination of these @see papers 2y Wjna2ou @199B5 2004CC. In contrast5 our model
does neither rely on capital market imperfections nor on politico-economic mechanisms 2ut
emphasi:es the interaction of product market po-er and distri2ution-determined demand for
innovative products.
Uurphy5 Shleifer5 and [ishny @19]9C have studied the role of distri2ution of income for
the adoption of modern technologies -hen consumers have hierarchic preferences. While their
formulation of hierarchic preferences corresponds to a special case of our model5 they analy:e
the role of income distri2ution in a static @developmentC contebt. There is no scope for price
setting of ne- rms in their model5 so any e!ect of income distri2ution is transmitted via its
e!ect on market si:e. In contrast5 -e focus on a dynamic @endogenous gro-thC contebt and
study the evolution of prices and market si:e for innovators.2
In another recent paper5 Uatsuyama @2002C discusses the interdependence 2et-een gro-th
and distri2ution under hierarchic preferences. In his model the distri2ution of income deter-
mines market demand in sectors -here learning and technical progress is possi2le. Yro-th
may initially 2enet only the rich 2ut5 depending on the income distri2ution5 may ultimately
trickle do-n to the poor. In Uatsuyama @2002C5 gro-th results from learning-2y-doing5 i.e.
a 2y-product of production on other-ise perfect output markets. In contrast5 in our model
gro-th is driven 2y industrial RiR and income distri2ution a!ects gro-th due to its impact
on incentives to engage in innovative activities.
Yreen-ood and Uukoyama @2001C do address the pro2lem of ho- the si:e distri2ution of
income a!ects innovation incentives. Their focus5 ho-ever5 is a partial eJuili2rium one in -hich
a dura2le goods monopolist chooses the optimal timing of an innovation given that consumers
-ith uneJual incomes have di!erent starting dates of purchasing the product. In contrast5 our
model is em2edded into an general-eJuili2rium frame-ork5 in -hich aggregate factor prices and
the gro-th rate are itself determined 2y the income distri2ution. This allo-s us to address the
Juestion of ho- income ineJuality a!ects long-run gro-th.
Saint-Paul @2004C investigates distri2ution and gro-th in the contebt of a dynamic mo-
2There is a small literature that emphasi:es the role of demand for innovation incentives @Falkinger5 19905
19945 Zhou and Talmain5 19945 Si5 199B5 Z-eim.ller5 20005 Ylass5 20015 and Z-eim.ller and Wrunner5 2004C.
do-ever5 none of these papers focuses on the role of ineJuality on the structure of prices and the ebclusion of
poor consumers from the innovator?s markets g issues -hich are central to our model of income distri2ution and
demand-induced inventions.
5
nopolistic competition model -hen consumers have non-homothetic preferences. dis paper is
2ased on the representative-agent assumption and studies the role of gro-th @productivity ver-
sus varietykcreativityC on the distri2ution of income among factors of production. In contrast5
-e assume heterogenous consumers and address the opposite chain of causality5 that is5 ho-
distri2ution a!ects gro-th. Wourguignon @1990C studies the role of demand for gro-th and
distri2ution under rather general assumption on demand 2ehavior. de sho-s conditions on
price and income elasticities under -hich gro-th enhances @reducesC ineJuality. In contrast5
our paper studies the opposite direction of causality and asks ho- ineJuality a!ects gro-th.
M further related literature is concerned -ith edirected technical changee @lennedy5 19B45
Mcemoglu5 199]5 20025 200QC. These papers put emphasis on the incentives to adopt particular
technologies and the conseJuences of these technology choices for the distri2ution of income
among factors of production. In contrast5 the heterogeneity in our model occurs on the pref-
erence side rather than on the supply side. This allo-s us to study the e"ect of an uneJual
distri2ution of income on the incentives to innovate.
The empirical literature on demand-induced technical change starts -ith Schmookler @19BBC
-ho nds a roughly proportional relationship 2et-een sales and successful patent applications.
Uost of the more recent empirical research has focused on the pharmaceutical industry. lremer
@2001a5 20012C sho-s in various papers -hy research on vaccines for Ualaria5 tu2erculosis5 and
the strains of dI[ is so minimal - despite the fact that so many individuals in poor countries
su!er from these diseases. dis main ebplanation relies on the demand side_ Potential vaccine
developers fear that they -ould not 2e a2le to sell enough vaccine at a su"cient price to
recoup their research ebpenses.Q Finkelstein @2004C also provides evidence that investment in
vaccines research responds strongly to policy-induced changes in ebpected revenues. Mcemoglu
and Sinn @2004C investigate the e!ect of potential market si:e on innovation of ne- drugs 2y
looking at demographic changes. They nd su2stantial e!ects_ an increase in the potential
market 2y 1 m for a given drug category increases the num2er of drugs in that category 2y
a2out 5 m.4
QMn additional ebplanation for this result lies in the di"culty to enforce property rights on medicaments in
developing countries.
4Further evidence supportive for the relevance of our analysis comes from studies that emphasi:e the im-
portance of income distri2ution for demand patterns and market si:es. Sooking at consumption patterns in
Yermany5 Wonus @19aQC nds that o-nership of consumer dura2les5 such as cars5 cameras5 televisions5 and refrig-
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3 The demand side
3.1 Preferences
Zonsider an economy -ith many potentially produci2le di!erentiated products indebed 2y
! " [0"#).5 Zonsumers? preferences are ?hierarchic? in the sense that the goods are ranked
according to their priority in consumption. Yoods -ith a lo- indeb have high priority5 goods
-ith a higher indeb have lo-er priority. We assume separa2ility and model the hierarchy as
follo-s. Zonsuming #(!) units of good ! yields utility $(#(!)) · %(!)& In other -ords5 utility is
determined 2y a ?2aseline? utility $(·)" the same for all di!erentiated goods5 and a ?-eighting
function %(!) -ith %0(!) ' 0& This formulation yields a ranking of the various products_ lo--!
goods get a high -eight @have high priority in consumptionC and vice versa.
We need to restrict the functions $(·) and %(·). We rst assume that purchasing a di!er-
entiated product is a ?take-it or leave-it? decision_ either a product is consumed in Juantity
1 or is not consumed5 so that #(!) " {0" 1}. This allo-s us to normali:e the 2aseline utility
to $(0) = 0 and $(1) = 1& This rst assumption is primarily for tracta2ility and analytical
convenience. Second5 and more importantly5 -e assume that the hierarchy function takes
the form %(!) = !!! -ith ( " [0" 1)& The instantaneous utility function can then 2e -ritten as
)({#(!)}) = R"0 !!!#(!)*! and5 -hen the rst + goods in the hierarchy are consumed5 takes the
constant-elasticity form )({#(!)}) = +1!!, (1$ () & This second assumption -ill 2e reJuired
2elo- to generate a 2alanced gro-th path.B
erators is strongly positively related to household income. Jackson @19]4C provides evidence for 2oth predictions
using micro data from the Zonsumer Ebpenditure Survey of the WSS. de nds that the richest income class
consumed t-ice as many di!erent products as the poorest class. Falkinger and Z-eim.ller @199BC present similar
evidence from aggregate cross-country data of the U.N. International Zomparison ProTect. It turns out that
the richest economy in the sample5 the U.S.5 consumed ve times as many product categories in esignicante
Juantity5 than Tan:ania5 the poorest economy in the sample. Ralgin5 Uitra and Trindade @2004C sho- that
ineJuality is an important determinant of import demand in the standard gravity model. They divide the trade
o-s into necessary and lubury goods and sho- that the the relation 2et-een ineJuality and imports can 2e
largely interpreted as a result of hierarchic preferences.
5 In Section ] 2elo-5 -e -ill consider also goods that imperfectly su2stitute for these di!erentiated products.
To keep the analysis as simple as possi2le -e rst disregard such products.
B In the eJuili2ria studied 2elo- households consume ealong the hierarchye_ a consumer -ho purchases a
range of ! goods -ill purchases the rst ! goods in the hierarchy. The restriction " ! [0# 1) makes sure that
the integral
R !
0
$""%& does not diverge.
a
Zonsumers have an innite time hori:on. Their o2Tective function can 2e -ritten asa
-(.) =
Z "
"
1
1$ /
"Z #($)
0
!!!#(!" 0)*!
#1!%
1!&($!")*0& @1C
-here 2 and 1,/ denote the rate of time preference and the rate of intertemporal su2stitution.
3.2 Consumption choices
Zonsumers are uneJually endo-ed -ith la2or and -ealth. The intertemporal 2udget constraint
of a household can 2e -ritten asZ "
"
Z #($)
0
3(!" 0)#(!" 0)*! · 1!'($(")*0 %
Z "
"
4(0)5 · 1!'($(")*0+ 6 (.)" @2C
-here +(0)" 3(!" 0)5 and 4(0) denote5 respectively5 the mass of availa2le di!erentiated products5
the price of variety !5 and the -age rate at date 0. 7(0" .) =
R $
" 8(.)*. is the cumulative discount
factor 2et-een dates . and 0" 5 is the @time-invariantC la2or endo-ment of household 5 and
6 (.) is the initial -ealth level o-ned 2y the household.
The household mabimi:es @1C su2Tect to the 2udget constraint @2C. Setting up the Sa-
grangian and dening )(0) & )({#(!" 0)})5 it is straightfor-ard to o2tain the rst order condi-
tions for #(!" 0)
#(!" 0) =
!"# 1" 3(!" 0) % 9(!" 0)"0" 3(!" 0) : 9(!" 0) @QC
-here the -illingness to pay 9(!" 0) is dened 2y
9(!" 0) & !!! 1
'($(")!&($!")
;
)(0)!%&
The parameter ; denotes the Sagrangian multiplier5 the marginal utility of -ealth at the
initial date . . @This can 2e translated into the more familiar ?time-0? marginal utility of -ealth
<(!" 0) = ;1!'($(")+&($!"))& The rst t-o eJuations in @QC state that5 at date 0" consumer -ill
purchase the di!erentiated good !5 if its price 3(!" 0) does not ebceed the -illingness to pay
9(!" 0)h and -ill not purchase other-ise.
adere it is assumed that the !(') goods supplied at date ' coincide -ith the rst !(') goods in the con-
sumption hierarchy. In other -ords5 there are no eholese in the distri2ution of supplied products along the
hierarchy. This -ill 2e the case in the eJuili2ria studied 2elo-5 -here innovators introduce al-ays the most
urgently -anted goods.
]
The consumer?s -illingness to pay 9(!" 0) is larger the lo-er the position of good ! in the
hierarchy @i.e. the higher the priority of good !C. Furthermore5 9(!" 0)) is the higher the
smaller is the consumer?s marginal utility of -ealth <(!" 0) = ;1!'($(")+&($!")& O2viously5 rich
consumers have a lo-er marginal utility of -ealth and their -illingness to pay is higher.
4 Distribution
It is assumed that all consumers have the same o2Tective function @1C 2ut di!er in their
endo-ments. To keep things as simple as possi2le5 -e assume there are t-o types of consumers5
poor = and rich 7" -ith population si:e > and 1 $ >" respectively. @We discuss in Zhapter
9 2elo- that our analysis can 2e ebtended in a straightfor-ard -ay to allo- for more than
t-o income classesC. Mll households derive income from -orking and from shares in prots
that accrue in the monopolistic rms. We assume further that each household has the same
income composition @identical la2or and prot sharesC. dence the ratio of the income level
of the poor relative to per capita income is ?) ' 1" and the corresponding ratio of the rich
is ?' : 1& O2viously the income shares of poor and rich must sum up to unity5 so -e have
(1$>)?'+>?) = 1& Taking @ & ?) as the ebogenous parameter5 -e have ?' = (1$>@),(1$>)&
dence the t-o parameters > and @ fully characteri:e the income distri2ution.]
We note that the assumption of identical income shares is restrictive and can 2e disputed
2oth on empirical and theoretical grounds. It implies5 for instance5 that the distri2ution of in-
come and the distri2ution of -ealth are identical5 -hereas in reality the latter is typically more
uneJual than the former. Furthermore it implies that there is no feed2ack from the functional
distri2ution to the personal distri2ution of income5 -hereas in reality changes in factor prices
typically have an impact on the si:e distri2ution of income. There are 2asically t-o reasons
-hy -e adopt this assumption. The rst is tracta2ility. When 2oth groups of consumers have
the same relative endo-ments -ith la2or and rm shares5 the personal @or si:eC distri2ution of
income is independent of the factor income distri2ution @-hich is endogenously determined in
the modelC. Mllo-ing for di!erences in the income composition -ould considera2ly complicate
the analysis -ithout adding much additional economic insight. 9 The second reason is that5
]The corresponding Soren:-curve is piece-ise linear -ith slope ( up to population share ); and slope (1 "
)()*(1" )) for population shares 2et-een ) and 1+
9For an analysis of this point in the contebt of a static model see Zehnder @2004C.
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under our assumptions on preferences5 an identical income composition implies that all house-
holds have the same optimal savings rate. This implies that5 in fact5 the initial distri2ution
persists over time. Mny impact of income ineJuality arises from demand-e!ects due to hierar-
chic preferences and none of the ineJuality e!ects is due to di!erences in the propensities to
save 2et-een rich and poor consumers arising from changes in factor shares.
5 Technology and price setting
5.1 Production technology and technical progress
The supply side of the model is simple. Sa2or is the only production factor and the la2or market
is competitive. The market clearing -age at date 0 is denoted 2y 4˜(0)& The goods are produced
in monopolistic rms under increasing returns to scale. Wefore a good can 2e produced the
rm has to make an ?innovation?. This gives the rm ebclusive access to the 2lueprint of the
ne- good and guarantees monopoly position.10 The innovation cost are modelled 2y a set-up
cost eJual to A˜ (0) la2or units. Once this set-up cost has 2een incurred5 the rm has access to
a linear technology that reJuire B˜(0) units of la2or to produce one unit of output.
Innovations imply technical progress. We assume that the kno-ledge stock of this economy
eJuals the num2er of kno-n designs +(0)& The la2or coe"cients in the sector that produces
di!erentiated goods are inversely related to the stock of kno-ledge. dence -e have A˜ (0) =
A,+(0) and B˜(0) = B,+(0) -here A : 0 and B : 0 are ebogenous parameters. Wages gro- pari
passu -ith productivity5 4˜(0) = 4+(0)" -here 4 : 0 is a constant. dence the cost of production
of di!erentiated products stay constant over time as 4˜(0)A˜ (0) = 4A and 4˜(0)B˜(0) = 4B are
constant over time. We choose the marginal production cost in the di!erentiated sector as the
numeraire 4B = 1" then 4 = 1,B&
5.2 Prices of the di!erentiated goods
Producers of di!erentiated products are in a monopoly position and can set prices a2ove
marginal cost of production. In order to determine the monopoly price -e need the monopolist?s
demand function. Zonsider the demand for good !. @For convenience5 -e omit time-indices
10Wy assumption5 -e rule out that there is duplication. So -hen a ne- good is ?invented? there is one and
only one rm that incurs that bed cost and captures the respective market.
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in this Su2sectionC. Ms consumption is a 2inary choice5 market demand for good ! depends
on ho- many consumers are -illing to purchase at a given price 3(!). With t-o groups of
consumers the market demand function is a step function @Figure 1C. Mt prices that ebceed
the -illingness to pay for the rich5 3(!) : 9'(!)" demand is :ero and the demand curve in
Figure 1 coincides -ith the vertical abes. For prices that do not ebceed the -illingness to pay
for rich5 2ut are strictly larger than the -illingness to pay for the poor5 3(!) " (9) (!)" 9'(!)] "
market demand eJuals the population si:e of the rich 1 $ >& Finally5 for prices lo-er than or
eJual to the -illingness to pay of the poor 3(!) % 9) (!) market demand eJual the si:e of the
-hole population in the economy -hich is unity.11
M monopolist -ill either charge 9'(!) and sell only to the rich @point M in Figure 1C or
charge 9) (!) and sell to the -hole population @point W in Figure 1C5 -hichever yields the higher
prots. The corresponding prot levels are5 respectively5 [9'(!)$ 1] (1$>) & !'(!) @point MC
and [9) (!)$ 1] & !$*$(!) @point WC.
Figure 1
Suppose + products are supplied 2y monopolistic rms and denote 2y ++ the range of
goods purchased 2y consumer C. Which rms set high prices 9'(!) and -hich ones set lo-
prices 9) (!)f Note rst that a situation -here all + rms charge 9'(!) and sell only to the
rich cannot 2e an eJuili2rium. If the poor -ould not 2uy any di!erentiated products at all5
their -illingness to pay for goods ! ' 0 -ould 2ecome innitely large. dence there must 2e
some ! : 0 such that !$*$(!) ( !'(!) or eJuivalently5 9) (!)$ 9'(!)(1$>) ( >5 -hich implies
that 9) (!),9'(!) : 1$ >& This leads us to the follo-ing
Proposition 1 Firms set the prices such that for all goods ! " [0"+) ], 3(!) = 9) (!)" and for
all ! " (+) " +'] we have 3(!) = 9'(!)" where 0 ' +) ' +' % +&
Proof. We kno- from eJuation @QC that 9+(!) = (!!!,<+))!%+ & @Recall the denition
<+(!" 0) = ;+1
!'($(")+&($!")C&dence it is straightfor-ard to calculate D!'(!),D! = $ ((,!) 9'(!)(1$
11O2viously5 if there are more types of consumers5 there are more such kinks5 and in the case of continuous
distri2ution -e have a smooth demand function. In any case5 under the take-it or leave-it assumption the shape
of the demand function reects the distri2ution of the consumers? -illingnesses to pay.
11
>) and D!$*$(!),D! = $ ((,!) 9) (!)& Since 9) (!),9'(!) : 1 $ >5 -e have D!'(!),D! :
D!$*$(!),D! implying that !$*$(!) $ !'(!) decreases -ith !. Since the poor consume al-ays
a positive su2set of the di!erentiated goods5 there ebist a good +) : 0 such that for any
! % +) " -e have !$*$(!) ( !'(!)& Finally5 +) = +' cannot 2e an eJuili2rium. In that case5
the poor and the rich spend the same amount5 hence the rich do not ebhaust their 2udget
constraint and their marginal utility of -ealth -ould 2e :ero and 9'(!) eJuals innity. It is
then prota2le for a monopolist to deviate and sell only to the rich.
dence Proposition 1 implies that the prices of the di!erentiated products are
3(!" 0) =
!"# 9) (!" 0) ! " [0" +) (0)]9'(!" 0) ! " (+) (0)"+'(0)]& @4C
Proposition 1 implies that the poor consume all goods ! " [0"+) ] and the rich consume all
goods ! " [0"+'] -here 0 ' +) ' +' % + . This means ?consumption follo-s the hierarchy?
in the sense that consumer C purchases only the rst ++ products in the hierarchy and no
products ! : ++& The poor purchase lo--! goods5 that is goods that satisfy the most urgent
-ants. The rich purchase not only those necessities5 2ut can also a!ord more luburious goods.
These o2servations lead us to the follo-ing
Proposition 2 The equilibrium is characterized by one of two regimes. In the rst regime,
+) (0) ' +'(0) = +(0)" the rich purchase all products that rms can produce. In the second
regime, +) (0) ' +'(0) ' +(0)" the rich purchase only a subset of all producible goods.
Proposition 2 has important implications for the characteristics of the 2alanced gro-th
path. We -ill see 2elo- that5 along this path5 the ratios +) (0),+(0) ' 1 and +'(0),+(0) % 1
are constant over time. When +'(0),+(0) = 1" and rich consumers purchase all produci2le
goods5 the most recent innovator sells the ne- product to the rich right a-ay and to the poor
later one. We -ill call this situation the eregime ISe @einnovate and selleC. When+'(0),+(0) '
1" rich consumers never purchase all produci2le goods. The most recent innovator has to -ait
for a -hile until there is positive demand for ne- good. We -ill refer to this case the eregime
IWe @einnovate and -aiteC. In the nebt Section -e -ill discuss in some detail the IS-case5 and
-ill refer 2riey to regime IW in Section a.
Regime IW may appear like a strange outcome to some readers. Mfter all5 in the real -orld
there are al-ays very rich people a2le to pay a very high price for any ne- product. So such
12
an eJuili2rium outcome is Tust an artefact of the t-o-class assumption @and -hich can arise
only -hen the t-o classes are su"ciently similarC. We -ill nevertheless consider regime IW5 for
t-o reasons. First5 it helps us to understand the relationship 2et-een ineJuality and gro-th
under a more general distri2utions -ith more than t-o groups. @We discuss this in Section
9C. Second5 a situation -here innovators incur costs in order to capture a ne- market may in
fact 2e more than a theoretical possi2ility.12 Such an outcome may occur -hen the innovation
costs are lo- and the prospective @futureC market is su"ciently prota2le.
6 Balanced growth: Regime IS
6.1 The allocation of resources across sectors
The economy?s resources consist of the stock of kno-ledge +(0) and homogeneous la2or sup-
plied 2y each household in the economy. Mt any date 05 +(0) is predetermined 2ut a!ects
current productivities B˜(0) and A˜ (0). Total la2or supply is normali:ed to unity. Since innova-
tion is costly5 a part of the economy?s resources are employed in an RiR sector that develops
2lueprints for ne- products. The remaining la2or force employed in the production of nal
output. The allocation of la2or resources across sectors is endogenously determined. We de-
note 2y E# the num2er of production -orkers and 2y E, the num2er of research -orkers. The
demand for production la2or is given 2y E# (0) =
R #($)
0 [B,+(0)] [>#) (!" 0) + (1$ >)#'(!" 0)] *!&
Ms the rich consume all feasi2le products and the poor only a su2set F(0) & +) (0),+(0)5 this
simplies to E#(0) = B [>F(0) + (1$ >)] & The demand for research -orkers depends on !+(0)5
the level of innovation activities at date 0& Ms introducing a ne- product reJuires A,+(0) la2or
units5 the demand for research -orkers is E, = A !+(0),+(0) = AG(0).
M perfect la2or market ensures that the la2or supply is fully employed at each date5 so
1 = E# + E, . Using the a2ove ebpressions for E, and E# 5 the economy?s resource constraint
can 2e -ritten as
1 = B [>F(0) + (1$ >)] + AG(0)& @5C
The dynamic analysis 2elo- focuses on a 2alanced gro-th path5 along -hich the allocation of
la2or across the t-o sectors stays constant over time. From eJuation @5C it is o2vious5 that a
12Ms an ebample5 The Economicst @Mpril B5 2000C notes in an article on epatent -arse_ eWiotech companies5
-hich often have nothing to sell for years5 nd their value residing solely in their intellectual property.e
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2alanced gro-th path is only possi2le if F(0) = F and G(0) = G do not change over time.
6.2 Prices and interest rate along the balanced growth path
do- do the prices of some product ! evolve along the 2alanced gro-th pathf Renote the
period -hen the good is introduced 2y . & Mt that date5 the innovating rm charges the price
3(!" .) = 9'(!" .) and the rich start to purchase. Ms their income gro-s5 rich households
are -illing to pay more for any given product and the innovator can raise its price. It is
straightfor-ard to calculate the rate of change in the price from the denition of 9'(!" 0)&
Recall that 9'(!" 0) = !!!1'($(")!&($!"))'(0)!%,;' and that g as households consume ealong
the hierarchye g )'(0) = +(0)1!!, (1$ () & Using this in the ebpression for 9'(!" 0)" taking logs
and the derivative -ith respect to time 0 yields
!3(!" 0)
3(!" 0)
=
!9'(!" 0)
9'(!" 0)
= 8(0)$ 2$ / (1$ ()
!++(0)
++(0)
& @BC
Prices gro- at that rate until rms nd it optimal to attract also the poor as customers.
Mt that date5 rms cut prices from -hat the rich are -illing to pay 9'(!" H) to -hat the poor
can pay 9) (!" H)& Mfter date H5 price changes are determined 2y the rate of change in 9) (!" H)&
The -illingness to pay of the poor is 9) (!" 0) = !!!1'($(")!&($!"))) (0)!%,;) -here )) (0) =
[F ·+(0)]1!! , (1$ () & Since F is constant along the 2alanced gro-th path5 !9) (!" 0),9) (!" 0)
yields ebactly the same ebpression as eJuation @BC.
We can make a slightly di!erent thought ebperiment and look at the evolution of the price
3(++(0)" 0). This is the price for the good -ith least priority @i.e. the most luburious goodC that
is purchased 2y consumer C. Setting ! = +'(0) = +(0) in the a2ove ebpression for 9'(!" 0) and
! = +) (0) = F ·+(0) in the ebpression for 9) (!" 0)5 taking logs and the derivative -ith respect
to time 0 yields @in each caseC
!3(++(0)" 0)
3(++(0)" 0)
= 8(0)$ 2$ (( + / (1$ ())
!+(0)
+(0)
&
Mlong a 2alanced gro-th path5 the menu of di!erentiated goods increases the at the same rate
as +(0) for 2oth types of consumers. This rate is constant and given 2y G& Furthermore5 the
price of the most recently developed good +(0) has to stay constant over time5 other-ise the
resources devoted to RiR E, -ould change @see the nebt Su2sectionC. Using !3(+(0)" 0) =
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!3(F ·+(0)" 0) = 0 -e can solve the a2ove eJuation for the interest rate
8(0) = 2+ G (( + / (1$ ()) " @aC
-hich5 unsurprisingly5 is also constant along the 2alanced gro-th path. O2viously5 eJuation
@aC is the eJuivalent in our model to the familiar Euler eJuation in the standard gro-th model5
and is identical to it in the a2sence of a consumption hierarchy ( = 0. Note further that5 in
the special case -here / = 0" the hierarchy parameter ( tells us ho- an increase in the range
of consumed goods a!ects the utility o-5 Tust like the elasticity of marginal utility in the
standard model.
Reinserting the interest rate @aC into eJuation @BC5 -e see that !3(!" 0),3(!" 0) = G(5 hence
the price of a particular good increases at a constant rate. do-ever5 the price of a particular
hierarchical position in the consumption hierarchy, !,+(0)" is independent of 0& In other -ords5
the structure of prices stays constant along the 2alanced gro-th path.
Zlearly the price structure is determined 2y the endogenous varia2les G5 3(+(0)" 0)5 and
3(+) (0)" 0). For further use5 it -ill 2e convenient to focus on the price of the most recently
innovated product and dene 3 & 3(+(0)" 0) = 9'(+(0)" 0)& Furthermore5 it -ill 2e convenient
to ebpress the price 3(+) (0)" 0) in terms of the endogenous varia2les 3 and F& We kno- from
Proposition 1 that the rm supplying good +) is indi!erent 2et-een selling to the -hole
customer 2ase and selling only to the rich5 as +) satises the ar2itrage condition 9) (+) )$1 =
[9'(+) )$ 1] (1$ >). @For simplicity5 -e omit time indicesC. We kno- further that5 from
eJuation @QC5 9'(+) ) = F!!9'(+)& Using this and the denition 9'(+) = 3" -e can solve the
ar2itrage condition for the price of good +)
3(+) (0)" 0) = 9) (+) (0)" 0) = > + (1$ >)F!!3&
In sum5 the price of a ne- good starts out -ith price 35 increases at rate G( thereafter5
drops to >+ (1$ >)F!!3 once rms nd it optimal to attract also the poor as customers5 and
increases at rate G( thereafter.
Four comments on the evolution of prices are in order. First5 it is o2vious that the discon-
tinuous evolution of prices -ith a discrete Tump -hen the poor start to purchase5 is due to our
assumption of t-o groups of consumers. Our analysis can 2e ebtended to many groups. In
that case there -ould 2e many such changes in prices in order to attract additional groups or
customers. Second5 -e have not allo-ed for learning-e!ects in the production of a particular
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variety. To the contrary5 the evolution of prices @or markupsC reects the fact that a particular
good ebperiences a higher -illingness to pay 2ecause the consumers have already satised. The
relative position of good ! in the hierarchy5 !,+(0)" decreases. In this sense5 a good that -as
previously a lubury good5 has 2ecome a necessity. This is reected in increasing -illingnesses
to pay and rising prices for this product. Third5 -e did not allo- for any changes in the mar-
ket structure. This implies that once rms have made a successful innovation5 they conJuer a
monopolistic position on the market for that good an keep these position forever @for instance5
due to innitely lived patentsC. Since prices gro- at a constant rate G( this implies that prices
gro- -ithout 2ound and the most necessary goods -ill approach innity. Mn easy -ay to
cope -ith this pro2lem -ould 2e to introduce nite patent protection and allo- for perfect
competition once patents have ebpired. While this -ould considera2ly complicate the involved
eJuations5 - although the model could still 2e solved - allo-ing for nitely lived patents -ould
not add any su2stantial insights. In particular5 as long as patents ebpire after the poor have
started to purchase the product5 the relationship 2et-een ineJuality and gro-th -ill remain
@JualitativelyC unchanged. Finally5 in our discussion in Section 9 2elo- -e -ill come to the
issue of price dynamics and sho- that5 2y allo-ing for a hierarchical structure on the cost side5
that our model can 2e easily adTusted to generate an eJuili2rium outcome -here prices do not
increase over time.
6.3 The innovation process
Up to no- -e have taken a continuous introduction of ne- products @and corresponding
increases in productivityC for granted. We no- look at the incentives to conduct RiR and
introduce ne- products.
It is assumed that there is free entry into the RiR sector and the eJuili2rium is a situation
of :ero prots in -hich the cost and the value of an innovation are ebactly 2alanced. The
cost of an innovation is given 2y 4A = A,B -hereas the value of an innovation remains to 2e
determined. Note rst that innovation e!orts -ill 2e targeted to-ards those goods for -hich
consumers are -illing to pay most. In Schmookler?s sense5 rms -ill target those -ants ethat
consumers -ant to satisfy 2adly enoughe. dence the process of product innovations -ill follo-
the consumption hierarchy.
To calculate the value of an innovation -e need to kno- the prot o- follo-ing the
1B
introduction of a ne- product. M successful rm has initial demand 1 $ > up until the date
-hen prices are cut and also the poor are attracted as customers. From that date on-ards5
all consumers purchase and demand eJuals unity. Renote 2y " the time interval during
-hich only the rich purchase a ne- product. O2viously5 " must satisfy +) (0 + ") = +(0)&
Mlong a 2alanced gro-th path5 -here +) gro-s at the constant rate G and -e can -rite
+) (0)1
-! = +(0). Taking logs and solving for " yields
" = $ ln[+) (0),+(0)],G = $ (lnF) ,G"
Note that " : 0 as F ' 1& O2viously5 the duration " during -hich an innovator sells only to
the rich is long if @iC the poor are very poor @so the fraction of goods the poor can a!ord F is
smallC and @iiC the gro-th rate G is lo-.
Recalling the evolution of prices and noting that -e have normali:ed the marginal produc-
tion cost to unity5 the prot o- eJuals (1$ >) (31-!(.!$) $ 1) at dates H " [0" 0+") @-hen
the rm sells only to the richC and eJuals [> + (1$ >)F!!3] 1-!(.!$!!) $ 1 at dates H ( 0+"
@-hen all households purchase the goodC. The value of an innovation eJuals the value of this
prot o-5 discounted at rate 8. Zalculating this value and setting it eJual to the costs of an
innovation yields the :ero-prot condition of the innovation sector
A
B
= (1$ >)
µ
3
8 $ G( $
1
8
¶
+ >F/0-
µ
1
8 $ G( $
1
8
¶
. @]C
6.4 Solving for the equilibrium growth rate
We can no- solve for the 2alanced gro-th eJuili2rium. We use Proposition 1 to re-rite the
2udget constraints @2C of poor and rich consumers5 respectively5 as
45) + (8 $ G) 6$)
+$
=
£
>F+ (1$ >)3F1!!¤ 1
1$ ( " and
45' + (8 $ G) 6$'
+$
=
£
>F+ (1$ >)3F1!!¤ 1
1$ ( + 3
1$ F1!!
1$ ( &
Rividing the former eJuation 2y the latter and making use of our assumption on the endo-ment
distri2ution 5) ,5' = 6$) ,6$' = ?) ,?' = @(1 $ >),(1 $ @>) yields an eJuation that can 2e
solved for 3
3 = I(F) =
(1$ @)>
1$ >
F
@$ F1!! 5 -ith I
0(F) : 0& @9C
The intuition for the positive relationship 2et-een 3 and F is straightfor-ard_ For a given
degree of inequality @as represented 2y the ebogenous parameters > and @C5 a situation -here
1a
the poor -ant to purchase a larger range of the di!erentiated products @F is higherC goes hand
in hand -ith a situation -here the rich are -illing to pay a higher price for the product of the
most recent innovator @3 is higherC.
We see from eJuation @9C ho- this restricts the relevant range of 3 and F& Note that F ' 1
and 3 : 1& EJuation @9C implies that 3 reaches innity at F = @10(1!!) ' 1& Uoreover5 -e see
that there ebists a critical value of F5 call it J" such that I(J) = 1& dence the relevant ranges
for the endogenous varia2les 3 and F are 3 " [1"#) and F "
h
J"@10(1!!)
i
&
To determine the gro-th rate -e are no- left -ith t-o eJuations in the t-o unkno-ns
G and F& The rst eJuation is @5C. We o2tain the second eJuation from re-riting the RiR
eJuili2rium condition @]C using eJuations @aC to replace 8 and @9C to replace 3
A
B
=
(1$ >)I(F) + >F&0-+(!+%(1!!))
2+ G/ (1$ () $
1$ > + >F&0-+(!+%(1!!))
2+ G (( + / (1$ ()) & @10C
It is o2vious that no closed-form solution for the eJuili2rium gro-th rate G and the consumption
share of the poor F ebists.
We kno- discuss the conditions under -hich a general eJuili2rium ebists. In particular5 -e
-ill sho- that5 -ith a eate hierarchy @( relatively smallC5 this eJuili2rium is uniJue. @The
implications of a esteepe hierarchy are discussed laterC. To characteri:e the general eJuili2rium
it is convenient to dra- the t-o conditions in the @G" FC space @Figure 2C. We -ill refer to the
former as the ZP-curve @e:ero-proteC and the latter as the RZ-curve @eresource-constrainteC.
We no- discuss the properties of these to- curves in the follo-ing t-o Semmas.
Lemma 1 a) The ZP-curve crosses the F-axis at F1) where F1) satises I(F1) ) = 1 +
A2, [(1$ >) B] : 1 which implies that F1) : J& b) When ( % (¯, with (¯ & /A2, (/A2+ B), the
ZP-curve is monotonically increasing in the (G" F)-space. c) The ZP-curve becomes a vertical
line as F' @10(1!!)&
Proof. See Mppendib M1.
Part aC of Semma 1 characteri:es the slope of the ZP-curve. The am2iguity arises 2ecause
the e!ect of G on the value of an innovation is a priori unclear @-hereas the e!ect of F is
al-ays positiveC. M higher G raises the interest rate5 2ut it also raises mark-ups and o-
prots. The former e!ect is the familiar discounting e!ect. The latter e!ect arises due to
1]
hierarchic preferences and is stronger the larger is (.1Q Provided the hierarchy is su"ciently
at5 the former e!ect dominates the latter. In that case5 the ZP-curve has positive slope_ any
increase in F has to 2e o!set 2y a corresponding increase in G to make sure that the :ero-prot
condition @10C is satised. Part 2C follo-s from eJuation @9C. There -e have seen that5 as
F' @10(1!!)" -e have I(F)'#& To counteract large values of I(F)" G must also gro- large"
other-ise condition @10C -ould 2e violated. Finally part cC of Semma 1 says that5 irrespective
of particular parameter constellations5 the ZP-curve al-ays starts out to the right of J&
Lemma 2 a) The RC-curve crosses the F-axis at F'2 ( J if 1,B ( >J + 1 $ >& b) The
RC-curve is continuous and monotonically decreasing in (G" F)-space.
Proof. Follo-s from eJuation @5C.
Semma 2 discusses slope and position of the RZ-curve. The intuition for the negative slope
is straightfor-ard. M higher gro-th rate G reJuires more la2or resources. With fully employed
la2or resources this is only possi2le -ith less la2or in production5 hence a lo-er F& Part 2C
of Semma 2 makes sure that the RZ-curve lies inside the relevant range of the F so that a
situation -here the rich consume all products and the poor consume at least fraction J of the
availa2le products is feasi2le5 -ith the availa2le resources.
Figure 2
The a2ove characteri:ations of the ZP- and the RZ-curve allo-s us to state the follo-ing
Proposition 3 Suppose the hierarchy is at, ( % (¯. a) If F1) ' F'2, there exists a unique
general equilibrium with a positive growth rate G : 0. b) If F1) ( F'2 , the unique equilibrium
is stagnation G = 0.
Proof. Follo-s immediately from Semmas 1 and 2.
daving esta2lished conditions for ebistence and uniJueness of a general eJuili2rium5 -e no-
turn to the Juestion of our central interest_ do- does the ebtent of ineJuality a!ect long-run
gro-thf The follo-ing proposition gives an ans-er to this Juestion.
1QRecall from our previous discussion that prices increase at rate ,"+ dence5 -ith a higher ,# mark-ups and
prots increase at a larger rate.
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Proposition 4 Suppose the hierarchy is at, ( % (¯" and a unique equilibrium with a positive
growth rates exists. a) An increase in relative incomes of the poor @ decreases the growth rate
G and decreases the consumption share of the poor F. b) An increase in the group share of the
poor > — holding ?) = @ constant — increases G and has an ambiguous e"ect on F.
Proof. See Mppendib MQ
Recall that an increase in the distri2ution parameter @ implies less ineJuality5 -hereas an
increase in the population share of the poor > g holding ?) = @ constant g implies higher
ineJuality. dence proposition states that more income ineJuality increases innovation and
gro-th.
To see the mechanism that esta2lishes the positive link 2et-een ineJuality and gro-th5
let us rst look -hat happens -hen the parameter @ increases. Such a change increases the
relative income of the poor at the ebpense of the rich. From eJuation @5C it is o2vious that
the RZ-curve is una!ected from that change. do-ever5 @ enters eJuation @10C via I(F)5 so the
ZP-curve is a!ected. When @ increases5 I(F) decreases" see eJuation @9C. From inspection of
@10C -e see that5 holding G constant5 any reduction in I(F) must 2e o!set 2y a corresponding
increase in F" other-ise @10C -ould 2e violated. dence the ZP-curve must shift to the right.
O2viously5 the ne- eJuili2rium has a lo-er gro-th rate and a higher consumption share of the
poor.
The result is the outcome of t-o opposing e!ects. On the one hand5 the rich su!er a loss
in income -hich decreases their -illingness to pay for ne- products. This is 2ad ne-s for
innovators? prots as the -illingness to pay of the rich determines prices immediately after the
innovation. On the other hand5 higher incomes raise the -illingnesses to pay of the poor. This
a!ects the evolution of prices and market si:e. When the poor can pay more5 rms -ill nd it
optimal @iC to cut prices and ebpand markets earlier than 2eforeh and @iiC to charge higher prices
thereafter. do-ever5 these positive e!ects are al-ays dominated 2y the a2ove negative e!ects.
The reason is discounting_ negative e!ects occur immediately5 -hereas positive e!ects accrue
later. In sum5 an increase in @ decreases the value of an innovation. To esta2lish eJuili2rium5
gro-th must decrease.
Zonsider nebt the impact of an increase in the parameter >& Provided that @ remains
constant5 this increases relative incomes of the rich 2ut leaves the poor una!ected. Such a
change a!ects 2oth the RZ-curve and the ZP-curve. From @5C5 it is o2vious that any increase
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in > must 2e o!set 2y a corresponding increase in F& dence the RZ-curve shifts to the right.
Uoreover5 the ZP-curve shifts to the left. Mn increase in > decreases the right-hand-side of
@10C directly and increases it indirectly 2ecause I(F) increases in >& It is sho-n in Mppendib
MQ that the direct e!ect dominates. To o!set this5 F has to decrease.
dence an increase in income ineJuality that results from a larger population share of the
poor > increases the gro-th rate. To get the intuition5 let us look at the :ero-prot condition
@10C. Even though a higher > implies a lo-er num2er of rich people and hence thinner markets
for the most innovative products5 the fe-er rich can pay higher prices for these products as
their relative income has increased @recall that ?' is increasing in >C. On 2alance5 the price
e!ect out-eighs the market si:e e!ect and implies higher prots for innovators early on. This
raises the value of an innovation. To esta2lish eJuili2rium5 gro-th has to increase. We can
look at the pro2lem also from the perspective of the resource constraint @5C. With a larger
population si:e of the poor > saves resources for the economy as a -hole5 as the poor consume
only a su2set of the products that are supplied on the market. These idle resources can 2e
employed in research5 raising the economy?s gro-th rate.
7 Other balanced growth equilibria
In this Section -e ebplore the case -here the hierarchy is steep5 ( : (¯& In such a situation
the nature of the general eJuili2rium may change. In particular5 the ZP-curve may 2ecome
non-monotonic5 giving rise to multiple eJuili2ria and the regime IW g -here innovators have to
-ait until their ne- good is demanded g may 2ecome an eJuili2rium. @In such an eJuili2rium5
innovators anticipate that there -ill 2e demand in the future and discount the resulting prot
o-. Wy incurring research e!ort early5 they preempt potential competitors and conJuer a
monopoly position on a ne- market.C
Set us consider the eJuili2rium in regime IW -here ne- rms have a -aiting time until
the ne- product is demanded in positive amounts. In regime IW5 conditions @5C5 @9C5 and@10C
change to
1 = GA + BF[(1$ >) ,J+ >]" @11C
1$ @
(1$ >)@ =
1$J1!!
>J+ (1$ >)J1!! " @12C
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1$ > + >J/0-
´ $ 1
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´/0-
" @1QC
-here 8 = 2 + G (( + / (1$ ()) 2y eJuation @aC. These are three eJuations in the three
unkno-ns G5 J5 and F. dere J & +) (0),+'(0) denotes the relative consumption levels
2et-een poor and rich consumers. Note that J is determined directly from eJuation @12C and
depends only on the hierarchy parameter ( and the distri2ution parameters > and @& It does
not depend on technological factors and is independent of the gro-th rate.14 This allo-s to
characteri:e the eJuili2rium graphically using eJuations @11C and @1QC.
In panel aC of Figure Q it is sho-n that -ith steep hierarchy an eJuili2rium in the regime
IW is possi2le. When the hierarchy is steep the ZP-curve is 2ack-ard 2ending. The slope is
negative -hen G is lo- and 2ecomes positive for higher values of G such that the ZP-curve curve
2ends 2ack in the IS regime& Mgain5 once F ' @10(1!!) : J the ZP-curve 2ecomes a vertical
line. M positive gro-th eJuili2rium in the regime IW is more likely -hen A is very small so the
ZP-curve is satised for lo- values of F. . In that case5 the @lo-C costs of innovation activities
pay o! even -hen the -illingness to pay of rich consumers is initially lo- and innovators earn
positive prots only in the future. This is intuitive5 in such a case innovators are -illing to
incur research cost even if they have to -ait.
Panel 2C of Figure Q sho-s a situation -here there are multiple equilibria. Point M is a
stagnation eJuili2rium5 and points W and Z are gro-th eJuili2ria5 dra-n in the IW regime.15
The reason -hy multiple eJuili2ria occur lies in a strong demand e"ect -hen hierarchy is
steep. The demand of an innovating rm depends on the economy--ide gro-th rate. If
innovators ebpect high gro-th they anticipate that their market -ill Juickly develop into
a mass market5 -ith fast-gro-ing prices and prots. dence optimistic gro-th ebpectations
support an eJuili2rium -ith a high incentive to innovate. If innovators ebpect lo- gro-th5
14Note that -e have already calculated - in our discussion of eJuation @9C a2ove. There -e have dened -
as the limit case in regime IS5 such that .(-) = 1+ In other -ords5 -hen the rich are -illing to pay ebactly
the marginal production cost -e are at the limit / = - = !# *!$+ When the -illingness to pay is even lo-er5
-e are in regime IW. In that regime - is constant5 -hereas / falls short of -+ dence there ebists a smooth
transition 2et-een regimes IS and IW.
15The -ay panel 2C in Figure 4 is dra-n is ebemplary. Wy means of simulations it turns out that the 2ad
eJuili2rium is al-ays stagnation5 -hereas positive gro-th eJuili2ria may 2e either 2oth in regime IW5 2oth in
regime IS5 or one @-ith the lo-er gro-th rateC in IS and the other @-ith the higher gro-th rateC in IW.
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prot ebpectations and the resulting incentive to innovate is correspondingly lo-. dence a lo-
level of innovative activities is sustained 2y pessimistic ebpectations and vice versa.
The presence of steep hierarchy leaves the impact of income ineJuality on gro-th remains
Jualitatively unchanged for most cases. The situation is ebactly the same as in the IS-regime.
In the IW-situation5 the situation is slightly more complicated. Uore eJuality not necessarily
implies that more resources are needed @for a given gro-th rateC. The reason is that the poor do
consume more 2ut the rich consume less goods. Yraphically5 an increase in the relative income
of the poor @ shifts the ZP-curve to right 2ut also the RZ-curve is a!ected @in regime IW an
increase in @ raises J" and shifts the RZ-curve to the rightC. do-ever5 simulations render the
result that the overall change is a reduced gro-th rate -hen @ increases or > decreases.
Proposition 5 Assume the hierarchy is steep, ( : (¯" and a unique equilibrium with a positive
growth rates exists. a) An increase in relative incomes of the poor @ decreases the growth rate G
and decreases the consumption share of the poor F and increases the consumption share of the
rich J. b) An increase in the group share of the poor > — holding ?) = @ constant — increases
the consumption share of the rich J" decreases the growth rate G and has an ambiguous e"ect
on F&
Figure Q
8 A non-innovative sector
The a2ove analysis has sho-n that5 under most circumstances5 higher ineJuality tends to
increase gro-th. The driving force 2ehind this result is the impact of ineJuality on price
setting 2ehavior of rms. When the rich are more -ealthy5 they pay higher prices for ne-
products spurring the incentive to innovate. One could argue that the set-up of our model
gives innovative rms too much market po-er. In the a2sence of any reasona2le su2stitute
for the innovative products5 monopolistic producer -ill 2e a2le to fully ebploit their monopoly
position. In order to tackle this issue -e ebtend our model for a non-innovative sector. We
assume this sector produces a good that su2stitutes @al2eit imperfectlyC for the innovative
products. Zlearly5 this should put an tighter limit on the price setting scope of innovators.
2Q
When prices of innovative products are too high5 consumers -ill devote their ebpenditures
to-ards to the relatively cheaper non-innovative products.
We denote the @homogenous and perfectly divisi2leC output of the non-innovative sector
2y K. @M possi2le di!erent interpretation of K is leisureC. For simplicity -e assume @iC the
non-innovative sector produces output -ith a linear technology that reJuires L la2or units
to produce one unit of output. @iiC There is no technical progress in this sector5 hence the
la2or coe"cient L is constant over time. @iiiC The output market is competitive5 prices eJual
marginal cost of production 33(0) = 4˜(0)L = 4L+(0)&
Mssume further that5 Tust like 2efore5 utility on the set of di!erentiated products. In
addition5 ho-ever5 utility is positively a!ected 2y the Juantity of the traditional good K& We
assume a Zo22-Rouglas relationship -ith parameter M5 -here 0 % M ' 1&1B dence the utility
function changes to
)(K" {#(!)}) = K4
Z #
0
!!!#(!)*!& @14C
In the rst part of Mppendib M45 -e sho- that in Regime IS the eJuili2rium conditions change
as follo-s.1a The full-employment condition @RZ-curveC has to account for employment in the
non-innovative sector5 so eJuation @5C changes to
1 = GA + B (>F+ 1$ >) + L M
1$ (
£
>2F+ >(1$ >)F1!!I(F) + (1$ >)I(F)¤ " @15C
-hereas the :ero-prot condition @ZP-curveC remains the same as in @10C. do-ever5 as men-
tioned a2ove5 the scope for price setting of innovative rms5 as captured 2y the function I(F)"
is no- di!erent. EJuation @9C changes to
I(F) =
h
M> + (1 + M) 1!55
6
1!6
i
F
1 + M $ £1 + M(1$ >) + (1 + M) 1!55 ¤F1!! " -ith I0(F) : 0& @1BC
@It is straightfor-ard to verify that5 setting M = 0" eJuations @15C and @1BC simplify to @5C and
@9C a2ove.C The additional @thirdC term in @15C eJuals la2or demand in the non-innovative
1BThe Zo22-Rouglas implies that ebpenditure shares are per se not systematically related to the income level.
In eJuili2rium5 ho-ever5 rich and poor consumers have a di!erent ebpenditure share of the homogenous product
2ecause the poor consume less di!erentiated products and face a di!erent average price level for these products
than the rich.
1adere -e study only regime IS. For a treatment of regime IW5 see Foellmi and Z-eim.ller @2004C. do-ever5
the ineJuality gro-th-regime is Jualitatively the same in 2oth regimes.
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sectorh and the enriched ebpression for I(F) in @1BC accounts for the fact that the scope for
price setting for innovators is no- more limited due to the presence of goods that can su2stitute
@al2eit imperfectlyC the di!erentiated products. Ms can 2e checked 2y di!erentiating @1BC the
price I(F) indeed decreases in M for a given F.
Note that RZ-curve dened 2y eJuation @15C is do-n-ards sloping in the @F" GC space.
dence5 it can 2e sho-n @see Foellmi and Z-eim.ller5 2004C that5 -ith a at hierarchy5 a uniJue
general eJuili2rium of this ebtended model ebists.1] Uoreover5 it is straightfor-ard to analy:e
the impact of income ineJuality on gro-th in this ebtended model. The leads us to the follo-ing
Proposition 6 a) An increase in the relative income share of the poor @ leads to an unam-
biguous reduction in the growth rate. b) An increase in the population share of the poor > has
now an ambiguous impact on growth.
Part aC of Proposition B states that our previous result g a lo-er distance in incomes
2et-een rich and poor is harmful for long-run gro-th g survives even -hen -e introduce a
non-innovative sector. The reason is the same as 2efore_ lo-er incomes of the rich and higher
incomes of the poor lead to more 2ackloaded prots. This reduces the incentive to innovate.
dence in the ebtended model ebactly the same mechanism is at -ork as in the 2asic model
-ithout a non-innovative sector. The 2ackloading-e!ect of income ineJuality on the prot o-
is ro2ust to the presence of a non-innovative sector.
do-ever5 Part 2C of Proposition B states that the e!ect of the population share > is di!erent
in the ebtended model as compared to the 2asic model -ithout an non-innovative sector. Ms
the increase in > g holding @ constant g implies the @fe-erC rich are no- more -ealthy5 they are
-illing to pay more for the most recent innovator?s product. dence the price of the most recent
innovator?s product increases5 -hile the si:e of the market decreases. When M is negligi2le
@the non-innovative sector is a2sentC5 the price e!ect al-ays dominates the market-si:e e!ect.
do-ever5 -hen M is su"ciently large5 the price e!ect is -eakened and the market-si:e e!ect
dominates. In that case5 more income inequality due to an increase in > reduces the gro-th
rate. The reason for this result is that the presence of a su2stitute limits the market po-er
1]The case of a steep hierarchy does not add particular su2stance to the analysis. Just like in the 2asic
model -ithout a non-innovative sector @iC the ZP-curve 2ends 2ack-ard @the parameter 0 does not enter the
ZP-eJuation directlyCh and @iiC multiple eJuili2ria are possi2le. Just like in the 2asic mode5 the relationship
2et-een ineJuality and gro-th -ith a steep hierarchy is Jualitatively identical to the one -ith a at hierarchy.
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of monopolistic rms. With M = 0" in the a2sence of adeJuate su2stitutes5 consumers are
eforcede to purchase the monopolistic products at very high prices. In contrast5 -ith M : 0"
such a su2stitute ebists. When prices 2ecome too high5 demand is directed to-ards the non-
innovative sector. This limits the scope for the price setting of the monopolistic rms. Price
e!ects 2ecome -eaker and the market si:e e!ect 2ecomes dominant.
The introduction of a non-innovative sector opens up the possi2ility for a further5 and Juite
di!erent5 outcome. Unlike in the 2asic model5 the 2alanced gro-th eJuili2rium could feature
a situation -here not only the rich 2ut also the poor purchase all innovative goods5 hence
+) = +' = +& In the a2sence of a non-innovative sector5 such a situation could never happen.
If rich and poor consumed the same num2er of goods5 their ebpenditures -ould 2e identical g
the rich -ould not ebhaust their 2udget constraint. do-ever5 if a non-innovative sector ebists5
the rich simply consume more traditional goods to ebhaust their 2udget constraint. In other
-ords5 the presence of a non-innovative sector puts an upper 2ound on the -illingness to pay
of the rich for di!erentiated products. We sho-n in the second part of Mppendib M45 that the
resource-constraint and the :ero-prot conditions change to
1 = GA + B+ B3
1 + $ $ @
(1$ ()@ & @1aC
and
A
B
=
3
2+ G/ (1$ () $
1
2+ G (( + / (1$ ()) & @1]C
-ith G and 3 2eing the unkno-ns. @Note that -hen +) (0) = +(0)" F eJuals unity and can no
longer serve as an endogenous varia2le. It is replaced 2y 35 the price the poor are -illing to pay
for the most recent innovator?s productC. It is easy to sho- @see Foellmi and Z-eim.ller @2004CC
that5 under certain parameter constellations5 there ebists a uniJue 2alanced gro-th eJuili2rium
in -hich 2oth @1aC and @1]C are satised. In such an eJuili2rium5 the ineJuality-gro-th relation
changes fundamentally.
Proposition 7 a) In a balanced growth regime, where both rich and poor consumer purchase
all di"erentiated products, so that +) (0) = +'(0) = +(0)" an increase in the relative income
of the poor @ unambiguously increases growth. b) A change in the population share of the poor
> leaves the growth rate una"ected.
Proof. see Proposition 4 of Foellmi and Z-eim.ller @2004C.
2B
The result in part aC of Proposition a is very intuitive. When the monopolistic rms sell to
2oth groups5 the -illingness to pay 2y the poor is decisive for price setting. When @ increases5
the poor are -illing to pay more for ne- goods5 hence innovators can raise prices and increase
prots. This raises the innovation incentives and increases gro-th. On the other hand5 a
change in the groups si:e > has no e!ect. Ms long as not only the rich5 2ut also the poor
consume the most recent innovator?s product5 neither the si:e of the market nor the price that
the innovator can charge are a!ected. dence innovation incentives are una!ected.19
9 Discussion
Our model has emphasi:ed the role of income distri2ution for the incentive to conduct industrial
RiR -hen innovations are edemand-inducede. We have started out from very simplifying
assumptions 2oth on the distri2ution of income and on the form of preferences. We no-
discuss the ro2ustness of our results -ith respect to changes in these assumptions and mention
some empirical implications.
Distribution Our discussion -as 2ased on the assumption that there are only t-o types of
consumers. We sho- no- that the analysis can 2e ebtended to a general distri2ution. We rst
discuss the characteristics of an eJuili2rium -ithout a non-innovative sector and look at the
e!ects of redistri2ution. We then sho- ho- results change -hen -e consider the more general
case -hen there is a non-innovative sector and discuss the impact of distri2utional changes in
that contebt.
Suppose there are more than t-o groups and indeb groups 2y N5 N = 1" &&&" N¯ -ith group
N = 1 the richest and N = N¯ the poorest group. With N¯ groups of consumers5 rms face an
N¯-step demand function and have the choice either to sell only to the richest group N = 15
19To get a sense for the Juantitative implications consider the follo-ing numerical ebample. Set 1 = 5# 2 =
0+3# 3 = 2# " = 0+3# 4 = 0+02# and 0 = 0+8+ Ms default values for ineJuality -e set ( = 0+8 and ) = 0+5+
The gro-th rate monotonically decreases in )+ For ) = 0+1 the gro-th rate , eJuals 2+11% and for ) = 0+9
-e get , = 1+61%+
On the other hand5 an increase in ( a!ects gro-th negatively as long as !# (') 5 !(')5 i.e. the poor do not
2uy all goods. Mt ( = 0+7 the gro-th rate , = 2+25% and at ( = 0+92 -e get , = 1+40%+
do-ever5 for ( 6 0+92 the poor 2uy all goods !# (') = !(')+ Ms stated in Proposition a further increases of
( increase the gro-th rate and it reaches , = 2+17% -hen there is full eJuality5 ( = 1+
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or the richest and second-richest N % 2" &&&" or to all consumers N % N¯& When there is no
non-innovative sector5 the eJuili2rium can 2e characteri:ed as follo-s. The richest group -ill
purchase all + goods5 the second richest group -ill purchase +2 ' + goods5 the third richest
group -ill purchase +3 ' +2 ' + goods5 and so on. In other -ords5 there -ill 2e N¯ di!erent
market si:es5 -ith the most 2asic goods having the largest markets and the most luburious
goods having the smallest markets. Ruring his life-cycle5 the innovating rm -ill cut prices
N¯ $ 1 times5 each price-cut attracting one additional group of consumers. In other -ords5
each group 2ecomes ecriticale5 in the sense that an innovator?s price eJuals to the groups?
-illingness to pay during some period of the life cycle.
What are the e!ects of a redistri2ution of income under a general distri2ution of incomef
We can apply our results from Propositions 4a and 5a in a straightfor-ard -ay. Ms all groups
are critical5 any change in income of a particular group a!ects prices during a particular period
in an innovator?s life cycle. M redistri2ution of income from a richer class to a poorer class
reduces the prots of more recent innovators and increases the prots of less recent innovators.
This implies more 2ackloaded prots and reduces the incentive to innovate. dence5 in the
a2sence of a non-innovative sector5 more ineJuality is 2enecial for innovation and gro-th.
Zonsider nebt the more general situation -hen there is a non-innovative sector. In that
case5 not all groups are necessarily ecriticale consumers. Ms -e have seen in Section ]5 this may
2e the case already in the t-o-class society. In an eJuili2rium studied there @see the discussion
2efore Proposition aC there is more than one group a2le to a!ord the product supplied 2y the
most recent innovator. In that case the richest group is never ecriticale and the level of their
income does not play a role for the value of an innovation. In the presence of a non-innovative
sector the rich can spend eleft-overe income on the homogenous good. This logic ebtends to
the general case. M ne- innovator may nd it optimal to sell initially not only to the richest
group 2ut to the O1 richest groups -here 1 % O1 % N¯& Yroups N = 1" &&&"O1$1 are not critical
and their income does not a!ect the value of an innovation. When an innovator cuts prices to
attract additional consumers5 the price cut may 2e such that not only the enebte group5 2ut
more additional groups are attracted as customers. In other -ords5 the market after the rst
price cut encompasses the O2 richest groups -here O1+1 % O2 % N¯&When O2 : O1+1 there
is at least one group @N = O1 + 1C that is not critical. Similar reasoning applies for further
price cuts. The eJuili2rium is then characteri:ed as follo-s. When innovators undertake = $1
2]
discrete price cuts5 the life cycle can 2e divided into = periods @-here a eperiode is dened 2y
the time 2et-een t-o successive price cutsC. Ruring the rst period market si:e is O1" during
the second period market si:e is O25 ...5 and during the last period market si:e is O) = N¯&
The consumers can 2e grouped into = classes such that 1 % O1 % O2 % &&& % O) = N¯ richest
classes 2uy innovative products [0" ++] -here + = +1 : +2 : &&& : +) : 0&
No- consider the e!ects of a redistri2ution of income. Suppose there is a transfer from
a rich group N to a poorer group N0 that involves only consumers purchasing the same set of
innovative products5 such that O+ ' N ' N0 ' O++1& This implies that neither the market si:e
nor the prices are a!ected5 so innovation incentives and long-run gro-th remain unchanged
after such a redistri2ution. Similarly5 -hen this redistri2ution involves non-critical consumers
purchasing di!erent sets of products5 O+ ' N ' O++1 ' N0 there -ill not 2e any change in
prices and market si:es either. dence changes in income distri2ution involving non-critical
consumers does not a!ect innovative activities and long-run gro-th.
No- assume that a transfer occurs from a richer group N ' O+ to a poorer group N =
O+ @a group of ecriticale consumersC. Ms some critical consumers have 2ecome richer5 2ut no
critical consumers have 2ecome poorer5 the innovator can increase prices and prots during
the corresponding period in the life cycle5 -ithout any change in market si:e5 prices5 or prots
in other periods. This raises the value of an innovation and hence raise the gro-th rate.
O2viously5 the same increase in incentives to innovate could 2e generated from a redistri2ution
from poor to rich -here the latter are critical 2ut the former are not.
Finally5 let us nebt consider a transfer 2et-een critical groups5 say from a richer group
N = O1 to a poorer group N = O+ -ith C : 1& This implies lo-er prots during the rst period
and higher prots during the Cth period5 hence more 2ackloaded prots @see Propositions 4a
and BaC. do-ever5 such a transfer -ill result in a lo-er price distortion5 -hich diminishes the
share of the non-innovative sector. If the market si:e does not change in the t-o groups case
@Proposition Ba_ change in ? holding > constantC5 the outcome that prots are more 2ackloaded
dominates and gro-th is lo-er. On the other hand5 if the progressive transfer is associated
-ith an increase in the market si:e @lo-ering >C the e!ects from a lo-er price distortion can
dominate @Proposition B2C. Ms these patterns can already 2e o2served in the case -ith t-o
groups they -ill 2e present -ith a more general distri2ution as -ell.
In sum5 our analysis can 2e ebtended to a general distri2ution in a straightfor-ard -ay.
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do-ever5 the relationship 2et-een income distri2ution and gro-th is a compleb one5 and
depends on the nature of the redistri2ution.
Preferences We have assumed a very simple form of preferences. Yoods are indivisi2le5
either consumed or noth and the consumption hierarchy can 2e represented 2y -eighting the
utilities from satisfying the various -ants -ith a po-er function. The restriction of the -eight-
ing function to take the po-er form C!! is essential. It implies that demand functions @and
monopoly pricesC only depend on the relative @rather than the a2soluteC position of the prod-
uct in the hierarchy. Ms a result5 the mabimi:ed static utility function can 2e ebpressed as a
function of total @currentC ebpenditure levels5 the function taking the constant elasticity form
-ith parameter (. In other -ords5 in intertemporal pro2lems -ith a continuum of goods5 as-
suming additive separa2ility and -eighting 2y a po-er function is the equivalent of assuming a
ZRRM-felicity function in the one-good gro-th model.20 In either case5 these functional forms
guarantee a constant rate of consumption gro-th -hen rates of interest and time preference
are constant over time.
The assumption that goods have to 2e indivisi2le and either consumed or not5 ho-ever5 is
not essential. Ms mentioned in footnote 115 every su2utility function $(·) -ould do. The model
could still 2e solved -ith utility functions that allo- consumers to choose not only -hether
or not to consume a certain item5 2ut also ho- much to consume. To get the situation -here
poor consumers cannot a!ord to purchase certain items and non-negativity constraints 2ecome
2inding -e need a su2utility function -ith the additional property $0(0) ' #. This implies
that the su2utility function must 2e non-homothetic_ for instance5 a Juadratic form of $(·) has
this property -hereas the homothetic ZES-utility function does not.21
Evolution of prices The model?s prediction that the price of a particular product increases
over time does not match -ell -ith the empirical facts. For instance5 in a their classical study
on the innovation-di!usion process5 Yort and llepper @19]2C ebamined the evolution of real
product prices for 4B product innovations. They also found that5 in almost all cases5 prices fell
20Uore precisely5 Foellmi @200QC has sho-n that a felicity function of the form 7({8($)}) = R#
0
$""9(8($))%$
-here 90 6 0 6 900- is ZRRM in ebpenditure levels if the price of good $ can 2e ebpressed as a function of its
relative position $*! only. This clearly holds true in the present model.
21Foellmi and Z-eim.ller @200QC solve a representative agent model -ith Juadratic @hierarchicC preferences
to study gro-th and structural change as a result of non-linear Engel-curves.
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after the introduction of a ne- product.
Ms our concern is to understand the implications of edemand-inducede innovations for the
ineJuality gro-th-relation -e have kept our assumptions on technology and market structure
very simple. Mllo-ing for market entry g for instance5 as a results of ebpired patents g -ould
erode the innovating rm?s market po-er and allo- for falling product prices.
Note5 ho-ever5 that our model can 2e adTusted in a rather straightfor-ard -ay for falling
real prices such that a decrease in prices is due to unequally distributed incomes. Mssume
there is a ?hierarchical structure? on the cost- rather than the preference-side. Uore precisely5
suppose that the marginal production costs are given 2y J#(!) = (!,+(0))7 -ith P : 0" so
that goods at a higher position in the hierarchy are relatively more costly to produce. This
captures the idea that products -hich have 2een on the market for a longer period are cheaper
to produce. @Still5 there is a spillover e!ect -orking via the total num2er of developed goods
in the economy that decreases reJuired la2or inputs for each rmC. O2viously5 the 2alanced
gro-th properties of the model still hold as the utility-cost ratio is proportional to (!,+(0))!7
-hich is a @decreasingC po-er function. do- do prices evolve under such circumstancesf With
symmetry on the demand side5 the -illingness to pay of a consumer -ith a given level of income
is the same for all goods5 -ith the rich @poorC having a high @lo-C -illingness to pay for any
given product. This implies that prices -ill 2e high initially5 -hen only the rich consumers
purchase the ne- good5 and -ill gradually fall as rms -ith lo-er costs nd it attractive to
cut prices in order to attract also poorer customers.
Empirics of distribution and growth Our analysis suggests that the aggregate relation-
ship 2et-een ineJuality and long-run gro-th may 2e Juite compleb. The model predicts5 that
depending on circumstances5 the relationship 2et-een ineJuality and gro-th may 2e positive
or negative. We note that this result is in line -ith the recent empirical literature on this
issue. While early studies such as Mlesina and Rodrik @1994C5 Persson and Ta2ellini @1994C5
and Perotti @199BC found that there is a negative relationship 2et-een ineJuality and gro-th5
several recent studies cast dou2t on the ro2ustness of this result. For instance5 Warro @2000C
nds that this relationship is negative for poor countries 2ut positive for rich countries. For2es
@2000C nds that5 in panel-data5 a positive relationship ebists. WanerTee and Ruo @200QC
nd there ebists a highly non-linear relationship 2et-een the t-o varia2les. While in these
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empirical studies the causality issue is not entirely clear5 the availa2le evidence suggests that
there is no clear-cut monotonic relationship 2et-een ineJuality and long-run gro-th. dence
the predictions of our model may help to rationali:e this seemingly contradictory empirical
evidence. In the contebt of our model5 changes in the distri2ution of income may a!ect the
long-run gro-th rate in either direction5 depending on the nature of the redistri2ution.
10 Conclusions
In this paper -e have integrated Schmookler?s concept of edemand-induced inventionse into
an endogenous gro-th frame-ork. M natural implication of this concept is that incentives
to innovate depend on the distri2ution of income. We have identied various channels 2y
-hich a redistri2ution may a!ect gro-th in such a contebt. First5 a transfer from richer to
poorer consumers leads to more e2ackloadede prots5 that is lo-er prots initially5 and higher
prots later on. This e!ect reduces the incentive to innovate and harms gro-th. Second5 a
higher population si:e of the rich @holding the income of the poor constantC5 has a price- and
a market-si:e e!ect. The market-si:e e!ect is clearly positive as a larger num2er of household
purchase ne- products. The price-e!ect is negative 2ecause the rich are less -ealthy @roughly
the same income has to 2e shared among a larger group of rich peopleC forcing rms to lo-er
their prices. Whether the market si:e- or the price-e!ect dominate depends on the innovator?s
market po-er. This po-er is high5 -hen there is no important su2stitute for the innovative
products and vice versa.
While the intuition for our results is most easy to grasp in the contebt of a t-o-class
society5 -e have also sho-n that our results can 2e ebtended to a general distri2ution. In
particular5 -e have sho-n that the impact on gro-th depends on the particular -ay that
income is redistri2uted and -hether or not the redistri2ution involves ecriticale consumers.
M progressive income transfer from @non-criticalC very rich to-ards critical poorer consumers
increases the gro-th rate. Ms long as the price of ne- goods falls short of the -illingness
to pay of the very rich5 lo-ering the income of the very rich does not harm the innovators?
prots. Increasing the income of critical poor consumers5 ho-ever5 has a positive e!ect on
future prots thus raising the incentive to innovate and increasing gro-th. Mt the same time5
also a regressive income transfer may increase gro-th5 if the transfer involves a redistri2ution
from non-critical poorer to critical richer consumers.
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Needless to say that our model can 2e ebtended in several directions. dere -e -ant to
mention t-o ebtensions that seem particularly interesting in the present contebt. First5 our
analysis has assumed that gro-th is driven 2y the increase in technological kno-ledge that
arises -ith the introduction of ne- nal goods. Other potentially important sources of technical
progress -ere ruled out 2y assumption. For instance5 no learning -ithin sectors takes place.
do-ever5 -hen the amount of learning depends on the si:e of the market5 -e have most learning
-hen all demand is concentrated among a fe- num2er of sectors. Zlearly this -ould esta2lish
a 2ias to-ards a situation -here more ineJuality reduces gro-th.
M second ebtension refers to the fact that our model ebhi2its a scale e!ect. Removing the
scale e!ect 2y introducing a Juality @or cost savingC dimension @as in the models survey 2y
Jones5 1999C -ill Jualitatively change the mechanism 2y -hich ineJuality a!ects gro-th. We-
sides the e!ect that ineJuality a!ects the innovation process -ithin a sector5 higher ineJuality
is associated -ith more product diversity and aggregate RiR ebpenditures -ill 2e spread out
across a larger num2er of sectors. dence via this channel5 higher ineJuality -ill 2e associated
-ith less technical progress in the aggregate.
QQ
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Appendix A1: Proof of Lemma 1
Part a. In integral notation5 the value of innovation5 henceforth denoted 2y Q" is given
2y
Q =
Z $+!
$
(1$ >) (I(F)1-!(.!$)$1)1!/(.!$)*H+
Z "
$+!
³£
> + (1$ >)F!!I(F)¤ 1-!(.!$!!) $ 1´ 1!/(.!$)*H&
Evaluate this ebpression at G ' 0 @note that "'#C&
Q|-=0 =
Z "
$
(1$ >) ¡I(F1) )$ 1¢ 1!&(.!$)*H = 1$ >
2
¡
I(F1) )$ 1¢ = A
B
We solve for I(F1) ) = 1 + A2, [(1$ >) B]and Semma 1a. follo-s.
Part b. To determine the slope of the R= -curve5 it su"ces to check the signs of the
partial derivatives -ith respect to the endogenous varia2les. First5 it can 2e seen directly that
the value of innovations increases in F& Second5 take the derivative -ith respect to G and -e
get5 note that !'(+(0+")) = !$*$(+(0+"))"
DQ
DG
=
Z $+!
$
(1$ >)
h
(/(1$ () + ()$ /(1$ ()I(F)1-!(.!$)
i
1!/(.!$)(H$ 0)*H
+
Z "
$+!
h
(/(1$ () + ()$ /(1$ () ¡> + (1$ >)F!!I(F)¢ 1-!(.!$!!)i 1!/(.!$)(H$ 0)*H&
We give rst a su"cient condition for the second integral a2ove to 2e negative. If ( %
(¯ & /A2, (/A2+ B)5 the follo-ing holds F!!I(F) : I(F) ( I(F1) ) = 1 + A2, [(1$ >) B] (
1 + (, [/(1$ ()(1$ >)] -here I(F) ( I(F1) ) is true -hen the curve is up-ard sloping. The
condition on I(F) implies that the term in 2rackets of the second integral is nonpositive.
The same condition also implies the rst integral to 2e negative_ We directly see that
/(1$()+($/(1$()I(F)1-!(.!$) % 0 if I(F) ( 1+(, [/(1$ ()]5 -hich is a -eaker condition.
Part c. sFrom eJuation @9C -e see that I(F)'# as F' @10(1!!)& dence5 the keep the
value of innovation Q constant5 the gro-th rate G must go to innity as F' @10(1!!)&
Q]
Appendix A2: Proof of Proposition 2 It su"ces to ask ho- the eJuili2rium curves
dened 2y @15C and @10C are a!ected. From the static eJuili2rium condition @9C -e see that
89
8: ' 0 and
89
86 : 0& M rise in ? does not a!ect 7S5 since this parameter does not appear. M rise
in >5 ho-ever5 implies that less resources are needed5 7S shifts up. To discuss the shifts of R=
note that !$*$(!) = [>F! + (1$ >)I(F)]
³
;
#
´!! $ 1 and !'(!) = $I(F)³ ;# ´!! $ 1¸ (1$ >) =
I(F)(1 $ >)
³
;
#
´!!
+ >& Using the formula for I(F) from eJuation @9C -e get the ebpression
I(F)(1 $ >) = 6(1!:)<:!<1"" . dence5 I(F)(1 $ >) falls in ? and increases in >. With F bed5 -e
directly get the result that 8"%&%(;)8: ' 0"
8"$(;)
8: ' 0 and
8"%&%(;)
86 : 0"
8"%&%(;)
86 : 0& ZonseJuently5
the R= -curve shifts to the right -hen ? increases and it shifts to left -hen > increases.
Q9
Appendix A3: Equilibrium equations for regime IW When neither the poor nor
the rich can a!ord all di!erentiated products availa2le on the market -e are in regime IW.
EJuation @11C o2tains straightfor-ard. When +) ' +' ' + the demand for la2or is GA# +
B [(1$ >)+',+ + >+) ,+ ] & Using F & +),+ and J & +',+ ebpression @11C immediately
follo-s.
To get eJuation @12C note rst that goods ! " (+'" + ] have no demand. The structure
of prices can 2e ebpressed 2y using @QC5 3(+') = 1" and @from monopolist +) ?s ar2itrage
conditionC 3(+) ) = (1$ >)(+) ,+!!' ) + >. No- use these ebpressions for prices and eJuation
@aC to re-rite 2udget constraints @2C as
45) + (8 $ G) 6$)
+$
=
£
>J+ (1$ >)J1!!¤ 1
1$ ( " and
45' + (8 $ G) 6$'
+$
=
£
>J+ (1$ >)J1!!¤ 1
1$ ( +
1$J1!!
1$ ( &
Rividing the former eJuation 2y the latter5 using our distri2utional assumption5 yields eJuation
@12C.
Finally5 to o2tain eJuation @1QC5 note rst that innovators have -aiting time. do- long
is the -aiting timef On a 2alanced gro-th path -ith rate G5 this -aiting time T is dened
2y the eJuation +'(0)1-= = +(0)5 or eJuivalently5 T = $ ln(+',+),G = $ ln (F,J) ,G. dence
demand is :ero during the time interval [0" 0+ T)5 1$ > during the interval [0+ T" 0+")5 and
1 from 0+" on-ards. The price is 1 at date 0+ T5 increases at rate G( until date 0+" -hen
it falls to > + (1 $ >)J!! " and increases at rate G( thereafter. The production cost remain
constant over time. It is then straightfor-ard to calculate the present value of this prot o-.
Replacing 8 2y eJuation @aC5 T 2y $ ln (F,J) ,G" and " 2y $ lnF,G -e get condition @1QC.
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Appendix A4: Equilibria with a non-innovative sector With non-innovative goods
the intertemporal pro2lem of the household changes to
max
Z "
"
1
1$ /
"
K+(0)
4
Z #($)
0
!!!#(!" 0)*!
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s.t. 0 %
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Z "
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"
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0
3(!" H)#+(!" H)*!
#
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The rst order conditions5 respectively5 for #+(!" H) and K+(H) are
#+(!" H) = 1 3(!" H) % K+(H)4!!! 1
'(.($)!&(.!$)
;+
& 9+(!" H)"
#+(!" H) = 0 3(!" H) : 9+(!" H)"
$K+(H)
4!1
Z #(.)
0
!!!#+(!" H)*! =
;+
1'(.($)!&(.!$)
33(H).
The case +) ' +' = +
Recall that 3 is the price of the most recent innovator5 and from the a2ove rst order
conditon that 3(!" 0) = 3 · (!,+(0))!! for goods ! " (+) (0)" +(0)] and [> + (1$ >)3F!! ] ·
(!,+(0))!! for goods ! " [0"+) (0)]&We use this5 and the a2ove rst order condition to ebpress
to calculate eJuili2rium consumption of non-innovative goods as
K) =
M+
1$ (
[> + (1$ >)3F!! ]
4L
F5 and
K' =
M+
1$ (
3
4L
&
Furthermore5 -e use the a2ove ebpressions for K' and K) to re-rite the 2udget constraints of
rich and the poor consumers5 respectively5 as
45) + (2$ (1$ () G)6$)
+$
=
£
>F) + (1$ >)3F1!!
¤ 1 + M
1$ ( " and
45' + (2$ (1$ () G)6$'
+$
=
£
>F) + (1$ >)3F1!!
¤ 1
1$ ( + 3
1 + M $ F1!!
1$ ( &
Rividing the former eJuation 2y the latter and making use of our assumption on the endo-ment
distri2ution 5),5' = 6$),6$' = ?),?' = @(1$ >),(1$ @>) yields eJuation @1BC in the tebt.
With non-innovative goods5 the resource constraint is given 2y 1 = B [>F+ (1$ >)] +
L [>K) + (1$ >)K'] + AG& We replace K) and K' 2y the a2ove ebpression and 3 2y I(F) )&
This yields eJuation @15C in the tebt.
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The case +) = +' = +
No- denote 2y 3 = 9) (+) the -illingness to pay of the poor for the most recent innovator?s
product. From the rst order condition @third conditionC -e get
K) =
M+
1$ (
3
4L
&
We cannot calculate the corresponding value of K' as the -illingness to pay for the rich is
strictly larger than 3. dence -e cannot directly replace ;' in the rst order condition for K'&
To nd an ebpression for K' -e use the 2udget constraints5 respectively5 for the rich and the
poor consumers
45) + (8 $ G) 6$)
+$
= 3
1 + M
1$ ( " and
45' + (8 $ G) 6$'
+$
=
3
1$ ( + 4LK'&
Rividing the former eJuation 2y the latter and using our assumption on distri2ution allo-s us
ebpress K' as
K' =
3
4L (1$ ()
M (1$ >@) + 1$ @
(1$ >)@ & @19C
The resource constraint in regime +) = +' = + is given 2y 1 = B+ L [K) + (1$ >)K'] + GA .
Replacing K' and K) 2y the a2ove eJuations yields eJuation @1aC in the tebt.
To get the second eJuation in G and 35 consider the RiR eJuili2rium condition. The value
of an innovation in the regime +) = +' = + can 2e easily calculated. The innovator of
date 0 has demand 1 from date 0 on-ards and charges a price 3 that increases at rate G(&
Straightfor-ard calculation yields eJuation @1]C in the tebt.
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Figure 1: A monopolistic firm’s market demand 
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